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VIEWS & REVIEWS
Cosmology and Metanoia:
A Buddhist Path to Process Thought for the West
JAMES FREDERICKS

IN RECENT MEMORY, much worthwhile literature has appeared regarding the complexities of Alfred North Whitehead's relationship to Buddhist metaphysics. Without doubt, process thought has served as a
fruitful path for Western scholars in their efforts to gain a more refined
appreciation of the cultural vision and religious insight of the East.
Generally, this literature presumes that the strangeness of Buddhist
thought to the West can be overcome, or at least lessened, by interpreting it with a process metaphysics. According to this interpretive
strategy, in which the familiar is used to render the exotic more
understandable, Whitehead's process metaphysics serves as a heuristic
device for overcoming the alien character of Buddhist thought to the
West. While acknowledging the usefulness of this approach, it should
be noted that the strategy presupposes that Whitehead's thought is in
fact no stranger to the Western intellectual tradition. I believe this
presupposition needs to be called into question.
In presuming Whitehead's familiarity to and compatibility with the
West, his interpreters overlook an opportunity for appreciating process
thought as a critique of modernity arising from a religious standpoint
beyond it. With this missed opportunity in mind, I propose another
route which reverses the usual approach of using process thought to interpret Buddhism. Given the current results of inter-religious dialogue,
it might now be possible to use our understanding of Buddhist religious
experience to interpret the strangeness and virtually unprecedented
character of Whitehead's metaphysics to the West. In effect, Buddhism
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might offer a path through which the West might make Whitehead's
process cosmology its own. The reflections that follow are guided by
two hunches. First, although this new approach requires a religious
reading of Whitehead, it is a reading that is rooted in a Buddhist, not a
Christian cosmology. Second, I believe this approach will put us in a
better position to appreciate process thought not only as a critique of
modernity, but as a religious vision which opens up post-modern
religious possibilities for both Christianity and Buddhism.
These reflections are organized as follows: (1) an appreciation of the
alien character of Whitehead's cosmology to the Weltanschauung of
traditional Christian theism and the presuppositions of the Enlightenment, (2) an argument for recognizing the Buddhist warrants for
Whitehead's cosmology by means of a brief comparison of Alfred
North Whitehead with Nishida Kitarö, and (3) a religious interpretation of Whitehead's cosmology based on the debate between Tanabe
Hajime and Nishida Kitarö on the meaning of absolute nothingness.
I
God and the world stand over against each other, expressing
the final metaphysical truth that appetitive vision and physical enjoyment have equal claim to priority in creation. But no
two actual entities can be torn apart: each is all in all. Thus
each temporal occasion embodies God, and is embodied in
God. In God's nature, permanence is primordial and flux is
derivative from the world: in the World's nature, flux is
primordial and permanence is derivative from God. Also the
World's nature is a primordial datum for God; and God's
nature is a primordial datum for the World. Creation achieve
the reconciliation of permanence andfluxwhen it has reached
itsfinalterm which is everlastingness—the Apotheosis of the
World.1
These words, taken from the final pages of Process and Reality, are
1

Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York: Macmillan, 1929), p.
529.
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confounding for their seeming lack of consistency with the elaborate
metaphysical itinerarium which precedes them, yet arresting for the
compelling religious vision they express. It is in vain that we search for
a foundation or even an anticipation of this thought in the rationalism
of the West's Enlightenment. Nevertheless, the power of the religious
vision expressed herein is no more alien to the West's intellectual
heritage than the strangeness of Jesus' proclamation that the Kingdom
of God is at hand. It is the very strangeness of this vision that promises
to Christianity a restoration of what the modern spirit has taken from
it: the lived sense of the immediacy of the divine to the world and the
fulfillment of time in this immediacy.2
Both his secular critics and Christian theologians have interpreted
the late Whitehead as an apologist for Christianity. Certainly by the
time of the writing of Process and Reality God has become a paramount issue for his metaphysics. How can contemporary Christianity,
which has yet to overcome fully Pascal's modern dichotomy of the
philosophical and religious meaning of the divine, affirm Whitehead's
metaphysical God as the living God? The Christian theological tradition, quite as much as modern secular thought, struggles with the
task of incorporating Whitehead's religious vision into its own. If,
as Whitehead claims, Buddhism is "a metaphysics generating a religion,"3 then Christianity must be recognized as a religion perennially in search of a metaphysics, and for this reason, a religion whose
lack of an adequate metaphysical conception of God is both the index
of its incompleteness and the hallmark of its own unsettled religiosity.
Instead of metaphysics, Christianity looks to the "tremendous fact"4 of
Christ; a fact that can be generated from neither neo-Platonic nor any
other brand of metaphysics; a fact that ultimately defeats metaphysics
by its eternal unwillingness to be bound by conceptualization. If this
"tremendous fact" resists any attempt at being encompassed within
the horizon of the Western metaphysical tradition (as Whitehead
argues), might its religious meaning be interpreted from within the intellectual horizon of the East?
2

Thomas Altizer, "The Buddhist Ground of Whitehead's God," Process Studies 5/
4 (1975): 227-236.
3
Alfred North Whitehead, Religion in the Making (New York: Meridian Books,
1960), p. 50.
4
Ibid., p. 51.
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This would atfirstseem to be an unlikely possibility. In Whitehead's
interpretation, Buddhism is "the most colossal example in history of
applied metaphysics'* the defect of which is that a metaphysical system
is "a neat little system of thought, which thereby over-simplifies its expression of the world."5 In this respect, it is Christianity and not Buddhism which should be more open to the historical novelty of "fact."
Yet "fact," for Whitehead, refers not only to the novelty of the Christevent asserted by Christian belief, but carries with it a peculiar meaning
that lays claim to a privileged position within his metaphysics. After
arguing that any "summary conclusion" regarding the meaning of the
order of nature (such as "The Absolute," "Brahma," or "God")
jumps from the conviction about the existence of order to "the easy
assumption that there is an ultimate reality which, in some unexplained
way, is to be appealed to for the removal of perplexity," Whitehead
offers the intriguing comment that this "summary conclusion" constitutes "the great refusal of rationality to assert its rights." Instead, he
suggests that "the sheer statement, of what things are, may contain
elements explanatory of why things are."6
More simply put, Whitehead insists that every fact has its own intrinsic reality, or value.
Realization therefore is in itself the attainment of value. But
there is no such thing as mere value. Value is the outcome of
limitation. The definitefiniteentity is the selected mode which
is the shaping of attainment; apart from such shaping into
individual matter of fact there is no attainment. The mere
fusion of all that there is would be the nonentity of indefiniteness. The salvation of reality is in its obstinate, irreducible, matter-of-fact entities, which are limited to be no
other than themselves, (emphasis mine)7
Perhaps no other aspect of Whitehead's thought registers with more
strangeness than his assertion of the salvine meaning of "obstinate, irreducible, matter-of-fact entities." This assertion, however, is alien
5

Ibid., p. 50.
Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (new York: Free Press,
1925), p. 92.
7
Ibid., p. 94.
6
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not only to the ethical monotheism of Western Christianity. By wedding "fact" to "value," Whitehead unites what the rationalism of the
Enlightenment divides. It is, in effect, a critique of modernity from a
standpoint foreign to it.8
Whitehead's debt to Buddhist thought is a problem that will continue to be debated. However, not only their affinities, but also their
multiple differences testify to his relationship with the Buddhist
religion vision. The soteriology of matter-of-fact entities is but one example. This being the case, the relationship of Whitehead's process
metaphysics to the Buddhist philosophy of Nishida Kitarö is merits our
attention.
II
Nishida and Whitehead present cosmologies of such daunting complexity that, in trying to compare them, only a sketch of the manifold
problems for interpretation can be offered here. Two issues suggest
themselves for special attention: (1) their preference for the "immediacy" of concrete experience in developing a metaphysics, and (2)
the quality of "totality" in their respective cosmologies.
Both Nishida and Whitehead are concerned with the immediacy of
concrete experience as a metaphysical underpinning for cosmology.
Whitehead, addressing the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness,"
argues against the "abstractions" of being and substance in favor of a
metaphysics of "presentational immediacy." As this concept holds certain affinities with Nishida's views regarding "pure experience," so
also Whitehead's concern with the fallacy of misplaced concreteness
parallels in some respects Nishida's preoccupation with an "existential
matrix ontology."9 Experience is factorable into different levels
("worlds") based on an ontology of latticing apriorities of experiential
concreteness. Most abstract are the objects of the physical world; in8
For a discussion of the post-modern possibilities of Whitehead's thought, see
Thomas Altizer, "The Buddhist Ground of Whitehead's God," Process Studies 5/4
(1975): 227-236.
9
The phrase is taken from the analysis of David Dilworth. See his "Introduction:
Nishida's Critique of Religious Consciousness," in Nishida Kitaro, Last Writings
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), p. 14.
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creasingly concrete (experientially) and increasingly self-contradictory
(logically) are the biological world and the historical world. The most
concrete and self-contradictory level of all is the "place of absolute
nothingness' ' (mu no basho). Clearly Nishida shared Whitehead's
dissatisfaction with the "misplaced concreteness" of being and
substance and looked for an alternative in the immediacy of concrete
experience.10
If "immediacy" is a shared value in their respective metaphysics, the
notion of "totality" is a common characteristic of their respective
cosmologies. This is apparent in a comparison of Whitehead's notion
of process and Nishida's views regarding the "place of absolute
nothingness." Both Nishida and Whitehead attempt to account for
historical reality with categories which escape the presuppositions of
both Aristotelian logic and Hegelian dialectics. In Nishida's case, this
means that the historical world of "action" arises from the "place" of
absolute nothingness, which constitutes "the matrix of all becoming."
Within this matrix, "the universal vanishes and at the same time there
is immediate transparency from particular to particular."11 Whitehead
understands "process" as an ongoing "concrescence of prehensions."
This leads him to make the following extraordinary claim:
In a certain sense, everything is everywhere in all times. For
every location involves an aspect of itself in every other location. Thus every spacio-temporal standpoint mirrors the
world.12
Both Nishida and Whitehead are in agreement that every event is virtually present in every other event. Whitehead seems to affirm the "immediate transparency from particular to particular," when he claims
10

These similarities, however, should not obscure several important differences
which distinguish these two thinkers on the issue of immediacy. Nishida holds that not
only being, but dynamism as well must be counted as abstractions arising from the
ultimate apriority of absolute nothingness. In contrast, Whitehead recognizes beings as
an abstraction, but not dynamism. In this respect, it would seem that Whitehead's notion of process is not fully congruent with Nishida's views regarding the "eternal
now."
11
Hatarakumono kara miru mono e (From the Acting to the Seeing) in Nishida
Kitarö Zenshü 4:207.
12
Alfred North Whitehead, Science in the Modern World, p. 133.
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that "each is all in all."13 Nishida extrapolates his understanding of the
interpénétration of all implied by his matrix ontology with Nicholas of
Cusa's image of the infinite circle whose center is everywhere. Both images suggest what might be called a "cosmology of totality" in which
all dualism and distinction are overcome by the coincidence of opposites. This feature common to their respective cosmologies can be
clearly seen in their way of addressing the problem of the relationship
between God and the world.
In his final essay, "The Logic of Place and the Religious Worldview," Nishida clarifies his understanding of God and the world as a
"contradictory self-identity" (mujunteki jikodöitsu).14 Transcendence and immanence, absolute and relative, permanence andflux,God
and creature: all the differentiations that reason imposes on "pure experience" are unified into a paradoxical totality of self-identity when
grounded in the place of absolute nothingness. Somewhat similarly,
Whitehead, while addressing the problem of the "dipolarity" of God,
comments:
All opposites are elements in the nature of things, and are incorrigibly there. The concept of God is the way in which we
understand this incredible fact—that what cannot be, yet is.15
Whitehead's position approaches Nishida's cosmology in that the
totality and immediacy of God and world can be apprehended only in
the abandoning of object-logic and its principles of non-contradiction
and simple self-identity. Does not Whitehead's notion of the "salvation of reality by the co-inherence of fact and value" express the
"suchness" and "original naturalness" (ymen) of God and the world
as much as Nishida's position regarding the "eschatology of the ordinary" reflects Whitehead's soteriology of the "obstinate, irreducible
matter of fact entity"? In order to defend this vision of the mutual embodiment of God and world, Whitehead and Nishida are required to
sustain an uncompromised non-dualism which presupposes the coincidence of opposites as its logical form. If this is in fact the case, then
we must also ask if Whitehead does not approximate Nishida's notion
13
14
15

Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 529.
Nishida Kit aro, Last Writings, p. 69.
Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 531.
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of absolute nothingness in his process cosmology.16 For both Nishida
and Whitehead, nature and consciousness, God and world no longer
form a dualism of subject and object. Both elements are immediately
apprehended in an encompassing "total presence."17 It is only within
this totality, the "place" wherein every contradiction comes to be seen
as a paradoxical self-identity, that the salvation of reality can be
discerned in the matter-of-fact.

16

As with the suspicion of abstraction and the preference for a concrete logic, the
similiarities to be noted between "process" and "place" should not be allowed to
obscure a significant difference distinguishing Whitehead from Nishida. Following
Charles Hartshorne, it should be remembered that in Whitehead's understanding of
the process theory of creativity, "universal relativity" implies an asymmetrical (oneway) causality in which events flow from past into present. See Charles Hartshorne,
Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1970), pp. 20526. Interpénétration is emergent: antecedents lead to new actualities because concrescence (creative synthesis) takes novelty as its principle. In Nishida's case,
"unhindered interpénétration" is construed rather differently. Paraphrasing Hartshorne, it might be described as a symmetrical causality in which past, present and
future events affect one another simultaneously. Addressing this problem, Abe Masao
observes that in place of the uni-directional, successive and "non-reciprocal" (symmetrical) character of creativity in Whitehead's scheme, Nishida is unwilling to assign
any priority to conjunction over disjunction in articulating his understanding of
historical action in absolute nothingness. The world of historical action therefore is entirely asymmetrical: past, present and future mutually arise out of the "eternal now."
See Abe Masao, "Philosophy, Religion and Aesthetics in Nishida and Whitehead," in
The Eastern Buddhist, 22/2 (1987): 58. While Whitehead's "togetherness" is emergent
and novel, Nishida's "eternal now" constitutes the simultaneity of the "unhindered interpénétration of particular and particular" of Kegon (Hua-yen) Buddhism. For a detailed and carefully drawn analysis of this problem vis-a-vis Hua-yen Buddhism, see
Steve Odin, "The Metaphysics of Cumulative Penetration: Process Theory and Huayen Buddhism," in Process Studies 11/2 (1981): 65-82.
Hartshorne's distinction between symmetrical and asymmetrical relativity and Abe's
views regarding non-reciprocal and reciprocal causality may not be thefinalword on
this complex problem. To my knowledge, no commentator has exhausted the
possibilities attending Nishida's views regarding creativity. In the final period of his
writings, addressing himself specifically to the problem of "action" in the historical
world, Nishida insisted that historical experience involved a movement "from the
created to the creating." This position seems to mitigate somewhat a strictly asymmetrical/non-reciprocal interpretation of historical "action" in Nishida's thought.
17
Thomas Altizer, "The Buddhist Ground of Whitehead's God," p. 233.
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III
Tanabe Hajime (1885-1962), Nishida's younger protege at Kyoto Imperial University, offers a "minority report* ' on the meaning of absolute nothingness. Their collaboration dates from roughly 1911 and
continued in Kyoto after Tanabe's studies in Germany with Husserl
and Heidegger. However, beginning with his lectures in 1930, Tanabe
became increasingly critical of the Nishida tetsugaku, especially the notion of "place'* as a metaphor for absolute nothingness. During the
war period (1941-1945), Tanabe underwent a personal crisis which led
tp a painful and gradual metanoia that profoundly transformed his understanding of philosophy. Starting in 1941 (through the good offices
of his student, Takeuchi Yoshinori) the influence of Pure Land Buddhist texts is increasingly discernable in his lectures. These developments led to the publication in 1946 of Philosophy as Metanoetics
(Zangedö toshite no tetsugaku).18 Here Tanabe mounts a major criticism of Nishida's position regarding absolute nothingness which has
issued in a debate that continues to this day.
Although Tanabe's break with Nishida can be traced (in print at
least) from 1930, the publication of Philosophy as Metanoetics in 1946
presents a mature crystallization of his position vis-a-vis the Nishida tetsugaku. In this work, Tanabe mounts a philosophy of religion from
an existential orientation which includes critical commentaries on
Kant, Hegel, Schelling, Pascal, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Heidegger
(and the omnipresent but never mentioned Nishida), guided by the
Pure Land teachings of Shinran (1173-1262).
Throughout the work, Tanabe insists that his aim is not to offer a
philosophical reflection about the meaning of repentance (zange), but
rather to argue that philosophy itself necessarily entails repentance,
conversion, and the eventual transformation of subjectivity. Only the
extent that speculation leads to this transformation can it rightly be
called a philosophy. Accordingly, the path of repentance, or "metano-

18

Tanabe Hajime, Philosophy as Metanoetics (Berkeley: University of California
Press, Takeuchi Yoshinori trans., 1986). The original Japanese edition was published
by Iwanami Shoten in April of 1946.
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etics" (zangedö) is not merely one philosophy among others, but the
only possible philosophy.
"Metanoetics" carries the sense of "meta-noetics," denoting
philologically a transcending of noetics, or in other words, a
transcending of metaphysical philosophy based on contemplation or intellectual intuition achieved by the use of reason.19
In effect, Tanabe is envisioning a radical transformation of philosophy
as a purely rational and academic discipline. A proper understanding
of meta-noesis leads neither to what he terms "ordinary mysticism"
nor to yet another philosophy based on the "self-power" (jifiki) of
reason for criticism, but rather a "philosophy that is not a philosophy;" viz. & discourse completely reoriented by the religious experience
of transformation by "other-power" (tariki). Thus philosophy itself,
indeed, the only possible philosophy, is the discourse which results
from the awakening of subjectivity through graced transformation
and conversion. Tetsugaku, in other words, is the path of metanoia,
zangedö.
Tanabe develops the logic of metanoetics, what he calls the "absolute critique," by means of a commentary on Kant's First Critique
and Hegel's response to it.20 Pure reason seeks to establish itself as absolute knowledge about reality. Kant recognized the disruption of this
quest in his discussion of the antinomies of pure reason. In order to exempt pure reason from self-contradiction, Kant was required to adopt
an agnosticism regarding the noumeno, which led to the exclusion of
speculative metaphysics and theology from the realm of pure reason.
Hegel also recognized this disruption of reason in the antinomies but,
unlike Kant, attempted to reestablish reason (and thereby metaphysics) dialectically by means of a conceptual Aufhebung. Tanabe rejects
both Kant's agnosticism and Hegel's Aufhebung as different solutions
which share in the same inappropriate aim of protecting reason from
its own innate self-contradiction. Instead, he heightens the problem
by denying outright pure reason's ability to criticize itself radically
(moving beyond Kant) as well as its ability to overcome antinomy
with dialectics (against Hegel's solution). The problem of the limits of
19
20
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Ibid., p. 2.
Ibid., pp. 36-57.
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pure reason is not one of eliminating contradiction, but recognizing
reality's profound and abiding self-contradiction. Kantian critical
philosophy is not radical enough to meet the requirements of Tanabe's
vision of a transformed philosophical discourse, due to Kant's Enlightenment presuppositions, the reason that criticizes is never required to
submit itself to criticism. In effect, the transcendental ego remains
intact and reason is allowed to retain for itself the principle of noncontradiction.
In contrast to Kant's attempt to preserve reason's "self-power" for
criticism and non-contradiction, Tanabe calls reason to "awaken to
itself" and its inherent self-contradiction by reaching toward greater
self-consciousness.
Just as self-awareness must break through itself by awakening
to a consciousness of nothingness, so must the self-criticism
of reason run aground on the impassable antinomies of the
one and the many, the whole and the individual, infinity and
finitude, determinacy and spontaneity, necessity and freedom.
Criticism has no alternative but to surrender itself to this crisis of self-disruption, and to overcome it by allowing itself
to be shattered to pieces.21
Thus far, Tanabe has led us no further than the wastelands of modernity's unbridled criticism. His purpose, however, is not modern in this
sense. Given his faith that critical reason can be "awakened" through
its zange and transformed through tariki, Tanabe offers a critique of
reason that is religious, and I believe, post-modern. If not the synthesis
of the Hegelian A ufhebung, in what sense is "allowing itself to be shattered to pieces" also an overcoming of reason's absolute disruption?
It is both a matter of destiny and ultimate truth that in the pursuit of full autonomy, reason must finally break down. But
where can reason, shattered and sunk into sheer nothingness,
find a foothold from which to break out of its crisis by breaking through itself, from which to be transformed and resurrected from nothingness to new being? . . . The depths of
reality as a whole can be fathomed only when we are con21

Ibid., p. 38.
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vinced that the absolute consists solely in the transformative power of absolute nothingness.22
Therefore Kant's critique of reason is not the ultimate standpoint for
philosophy, but rather a compromise that leaves the subject intact.
Kantian criticism and Hegelian dialectic presume that the subject is a
substance and therefore must cling to the principle of non-contradiction. Branding this type of reason the "logic of self-identity" and rejecting the discourse based on it as a "self-power" (jiriki) philosophy, Tanabe offers in its place the "absolute critique" in which reason
"dies' by surrendering to its innate self-contradiction in the the hope
of "rising" through the transformative grace of absolute nothingness
experienced as other-power (tariki).
Implicit in his criticism of Kant and Hegel, however, is a criticism of
Nishida. Tanabe pointedly rejects the notion that absolute nothingness
can be realized in an aesthetic intuition into an experiential immediacy
prior to the opposition of subject and object. True nothingness is not a
"pure experience," but rather the transforming event of "otherpower." Were the absolute to "exist" immediately (and thereby for it
to be intuitable) it would be Being, not nothingness. In order for it to
be absolute nothingness, two conditions must be met: (1) it can "exist"
only to the extent that it is mediated by the self-negation (zange) of the
relative, and (2) it cannot arise as a simple negation of the relative, but
rather as its absolute negation in which negation itself is negated in a
radical affirmation. Since absolute nothingness has no intelligibility or
existence apart from the death and resurrection offinitesubjectivity, instead of Nishida's metaphor of "place" for absolute nothingness,
Tanabe speaks of "absolute mediation."23 Absolute nothingness, as
religious self-awakening, is realized only in the transforming action of
other-power. But the "otherness" of tariki cannot place it in opposition to the relative or else it would not be the true absolute. This point,
on which Tanabe and Nishida are in agreement, leads Tanabe to speak
of the mediation of absolute nothingness by relative being, instead of
its basho, for the metaphor of "place" presumes that the absolute can
be known noetically in an aesthetic intuition into the undifferentiated
Ibid., p. 39.
Ibid., pp. 151-192.
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immediacy of being when in fact it can be experienced only metanoetically in the transformation of subjectivity by other-power.
Tanabe's interpretation of absolute nothingness constitutes an important alternative to Nishida's views. Although he never mentions
Nishida by name, that Tanabe has his former teacher in mind is abundantly clear to any reader familiar with Nishida's work. Three points
are outstanding.
Most fundamentally, Tanabe criticizes Nishida's intuitionism for its
failure to grasp true religious consciousness. If the absolute is intuitable, it can be known noetically in contemplation, or what Tanabe
calls "ordinary mysticism." This mysticism is "ordinary" in that (1) it
takes as its basis the "self-power" (ßriki) of speculation (e.g. Hegel)
or ecstasis (e.g. Plotinus) and is aimed at the recovery of lost immediacy to the absolute, (2) it does not require the death and resurrection of the ego, and (3) it does not arise in the action (event) of otherpower. As Christianity objects to Plotinian mysticism for replacing the
radical death of subjectivity symbolized by the cross with a pantheistic
aesthetic based on an ontology of emanation, so also, Tanabe criticizes
Nishida's interpretation of the religious as an intuition into undifferentiated totality.24
Second, Tanabe criticizes Nishida for not distinguishing himself
sufficiently from Hegelianism. Hegel recognized the disruption of
reason in the Kantian antinomies but thought that this disruption
could be overcome in historical dialectics. Hegel, however, is not dialectical enough for Tanabe. Reason's contradiction in the opposition of
thesis and antithesis is resolved in a synthesis that restores reason to its
former state. This is a disruption, but not the "absolute disruption"
that constitutes the death and resurrection of reason and lead to its
transformation. Hegel's Begriff quite as much as the self-identical
reason of the Kantian critique, must deny its own innate self-contradiction. In Tanabe's reading, the Hegelian Aufhebung leads inevitably to
an intuited totality of Being, not the emptiness (shunyata) of true
nothingness. Similarly, since Nishida's dialectic of the "absolutely contradictory self-identity" leads toward aesthetically intuited totality, it
cannot be accepted as an adequate interpretation of Buddhist
nothingness. In Tanabe's view, the negation of negation, understood
24

Ibid., pp. 166-168.
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as the restoration of self-identity25 presumes an aesthetic intuition of being, not nothingness as transformative power (tariki). Tanabe's quarrel with Nishida parallels somewhat Kierkegaard's criticism of Hegel.
Hegel and Nishida presume that truth is a whole which allows it to be
apprehended and interpreted conceptually through the intuition of
totality. For Kierkegaard and Tanabe on the other hand, truth is
fragmented, not total; ironic, not aesthetic. Ultimate truth is known
only in the death and resurrection of the self that is the hallmark of
faith, not speculation based on the inherent power of reason for selfcriticism. It touches the subject intensively, not extensively. It is the
grace of that which is other than the self (tariki), while not being opposable to the self (the absolute mediation of nothingness) and also not
the achievement of self (jiriki).
The third major objection that Tanabe raises against Nishida concerns the suitability of the metaphor "place" for absolute nothingness.
Tanabe directly contradicts Nishida's text in rejecting the mu no basho
as the "abstract universal."26 Once again, Tanabe objects that the
aestheticism and intuitionism implicit in the notion of a basho of
nothingness cannot account for concretely historical and properly
ethical existence because it does not take the metanoia of the relative
and its transformation by other-power as its criteria. Tanabe develops
his point by drawing on the Pure Land Buddhist doctrines of ösö (going to the Pure Land) and gensö (the Bodhisattva's return to this
world).27 The standpoint of basho lacks the idea of gensö by reason
of its ethically indeterminate character. Only when the religious is
understood as the even of other-power can the concrete socio-historical
"direction of transformation" be determined. Instead of basho, which
remains in the realm of noetics, Tanabe holds up the meta-noetics of
"absolute mediation" in which subjectivity is transformed.28 The absolute does not exist as a totality disclosed in an intuition into undifferentiated experiential immediacy. It has no existence whatsoever
apart from the finite being of the relative. In place of Nishida's immediacy and totality, Tanabe argues for a concrete, historical and
25
26
27
28
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ethical mediation of absolute nothingness without recourse to what is
in Tanabe's assessment the abstract universal of "place."
IV
These deliberations have been guided by a belief that the unprecedented nature of Whitehead's metaphysics in the Western intellectual tradition needs to be better appreciated, especially for its postmodern possibilities, and that this might be achieved by reversing the
normal procedure of using process metaphysics to interpret Buddhism.
Reading Whitehead from the perspective of Nishida tetsugaku serves
to underscore to alien quality of process thought to the Western intellectual tradition by suggesting some Buddhist warrants for its metaphysics and cosmology. If a Buddhist reading of Whitehead highlights the
distance of his texts from his Western audience, perhaps an interpretation from the perspective of Tanabe's religious critique of immediacy
and totality might lessen this distance by suggesting a way for the West
to appropriate the post-modern religious vision underlying Whitehead's process cosmology.
Whitehead's cosmos is not simply the quantum world of Planck,
Heisenberg and Bohr. It is instead a cosmos fully known only in a
religious apprehension. Undoubtedly a religious interpretation is required to account fully for the obstinate interest that we witness late
in Whitehead's career regarding the paradoxes of God and world, primordial and consequent natures of the divine, permanence and flux.
This point confronts us immediately with the problem of what kind of
religious apprehension is most suited to Whitehead's cosmos. In this
paper, I have argued for the suitability of the Buddhist-oriented philosophy of the Kyoto School for interpreting Whitehead to the West.
The Kyoto School offers us twofigureswhose philosophical positions
are clearly guided by the religious insight of Mahayana Buddhism,
yet who present differing views on the nature of its religious experience.
If Nishida's intuitive religiosity of immediacy and totality helps Whitehead's Western interpreters to appreciate more fully the novelty of
his metaphysics, perhaps Tanabe's metanoetic transformation of immediacy and totality will suggest a way for the West to awaken to
Whitehead's religious vision.
Whitehead's cosmos is not the world of the Greek logos. The
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Western intellectual tradition annuls the actuality of the world by
subordinating the immediacy of experience to what transcends it.
Dichotomy is introduced into the heart of actuality requiring the world
to be known as something other than itself: logos. The dichotomy in
the Western consciousness is reflected in the West's cosmology as well.
Creation, object, fact, temporality, etc., appear in the Western cosmos
as formal opposites of subjectivity.
In the Enlightenment period, this dichotomous cosmos and consciousness was exaggerated through the dialectical use of reason. In
this respect, modernity presents us with a peculiar gnosticism.29 It is
gnostic in that it promotes a negative relationship between fact and
value as a means of denying what Whitehead affirms: the salvation of
the world by matter-of-fact entities. Process metaphysics underscores
the gnostic plight of modernity. The dualities of nature and consciousness, God and world, long to be restored to their concrete immediacy and totality. The fact that Nishida's view regarding the
"eschatology of the ordinary" seems to be the closest analogue to
Whitehead's soteriology suggests once again the possibility that
Whitehead's process cosmos can be better understood by the West if it
turns away from its own modernity and looks to the religious vision of
Buddhism.
This latter point suggests the appropriateness of appreciating
Whitehead's philosophical achievement as a particularly creative and
singular example of the West's longing to overcome the self-alienation
at the heart of its own dualistic subjectivity. Process thought presents
us with a concrete example of a post-modern cosmology calling for a
post-modern consciousness. Whitehead's cosmos arises when the West
overcomes what it learned during its Enlightenment: "the great refusal
of rationality to assert its rights." But it must be noted immediately
that the rationality Whitehead has in mind is not the Enlightenment's
artificially narrowed notion of instrumental reason, but rather a ratio
29
Eric Voegelin's famous diagnosis of modernity naturally comes to mind. Without
wanting to ignore the relationship that may exist between Whitehead's process
metaphysics and Voegelin's ideas regarding the "tension of existence," for present purposes the term "gnosticism" refers simply to the modern separation of fact and value.
For a discussion of process thought as a critique of gnosticism in this sense, see
Thomas Altizer, "The Buddhist Ground of Whitehead's God," p. 233.

126

BUDDHIST PATH TO PROCESS THOUGHT

awakened and transformed by the immediacy and totality of the real.
If Whitehead's cosmology arises through the liberation of reason, the
post-modern consciousness appropriate to this cosmos arises not
through a direct conceptual application of metaphysics, but through a
metanoia in which the death and resurrection of reason reflects in formal logic the death and resurrection of subjectivity in the religious experience of existential transformation.
Thus, Whitehead presents modernity with a new religious language
which requires the transformation of modernity's preference for
criticism. Process and Reality confronts us with a discourse which requires an awakening of subjectivity in order to be fully apprehended.
In a real sense, Whitehead's process cosmos will be "known"finallyby
the West only when it practices something akin to Tanabe's metanoetics: i.e., forswearing any claim to establish absolute knowledge
through criticism in the hope that, through the death and resurrection
of reason and the transformation of subjectivity, ordinary language
itself might become the mediation of truth which transcends criticism.
In fact, Whitehead himself may have been practicing something very
much akin to Tanabe's zangedö. Especially in thefinalpart of Process
and Reality Whitehead seems to move from the establishment of his
cosmology by means of his metaphysics more and more deeply into
a critique of this cosmology by means of his religious vision. We witness, in the final passages of this difficult text, a gradual negation of
his own categories. In a way that is difficult to reconcile with the reflections that have preceeded it, Whitehead claims that "God and
world stand over against each other . . . " even while he asserts that
". . . each is all in all."30 Here, not only the language of dichotomy
but also the language of totality have undergone a zange in the hope of
mediating a religious vision whose meaning Whitehead's cosmology
does not exhaust. Nishida's logic of "place" helps us to establish the
kinship of this cosmology with the Buddhist heritage. Tanabe's metanoetic logic suggests a way that the post-modern longing of the West
might find in this cosmos a fulfillment.

Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 529.
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